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Abstract1 
The issue of group-blind multiuser detection in MAC 
channel among wireless nodes in the environment of 
multiple networks coexisting and sharing spectrum is 
addressed under the Framework of coalitional game. We 
investigate the performance and stability of multiple access 
channel (MAC) with linear decorrelating multiuser detection 
under varying SNR, channel gains and coalitional structures, 
in which both single BS and multiple BSs cases were 
considered. The main results and conclusion are as follows: 
(1) the grand coalition is payoff maximizing under loose 
SNR; (2) it is in conformity with group and coalitional 
rationality forming coalition among nodes that have 
comparative channel gains. 
1 Introduction 
The dynamic sharing of spectrum has been at the forefront 
of radio regulation and efficient system design since the 
earliest days of wireless. Given that devices sharing the 
spectrum may differ vastly in their modulation schemes and 
protocols, especially in the unlicensed spectrum bands, 
receiver cooperation may only be feasible if one could find 
ways to jointly process their signals. A spectrum server (SS, 
such as the one proposed in [2] can serve as a central entity 
assembling and processing data, that enables disparate 
devices to jointly decode their signals, avoid interference 
and share spectrum resource more efficiently.  
 
There are abundant network and communication researches 
based on game theory. Yet to the best of our knowledge, in 
wireless network domain, few published results of 
cooperative game, especially coalitional game research can 
be found. In [9] Z. Han et al. proposed an approach based on 
coalition Games to overcome the problem known as the 
curse of the boundary nodes, and in [8] they proposed a fair 
scheme to allocate subcarrier, rate, and power for multiuser 
orthogonal frequency-division multiple-access systems. The 
approach considers a new fairness criterion, which is a 
generalized proportional fairness based on Nash bargaining 
Solutions and coalitions. N. Xia et al. propose a WSN 
coalition formation algorithm based on Ant Colony System 
with dual-negative feedback characteristic in [5]. They noted 
that their algorithm can balance the energy consumption 
among sensor nodes, so as to extend the network lifetime for 
more tasks. S. Mathur et al. studied the issue of sharing 
spectrum through receiver cooperation in wireless networks 
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under the framework of coalitional game theory in [6, 7].  
 
In this paper, we analyze the effect of cooperative group 
MUD under MAC channel based on the analytical 
framework of coalitional game theory, we compare the 
gains/payoff  and stability of variety coalitional structures in 
view of channel condition, SNR etc. in particular, we 
address the above questions take into consider both 
simplified single BS network models and the more complex 
multiple BSs scene. 
2 Coalitional game (CG) 
 Coalitions are formed among players in view of their 
individual rationality and group rationality. Coalitional 
Games come into two main guises, depending on whether 
the worth of a coalition can be freely distributed amongst its 
members or not: Games with transferable payoffs (TU-
Games), where the worths are transferable amongst players 
forming a coalition without any limitation, and Games with 
non-transferable payoffs (NTU-Games). The MUD 
coalitional game model here belongs to NTU-Game and thus 
we only present the definition of NTU-Games:  
 
Definition 1. A Coalitional Game without transferable 
payoff is a four-tuple , , , ( )i i NN X v ∈< ≥ > , where: 
¾ N is a finite set of players; 
¾ F is the set of all possible consequences; 
¾ : 2Xv s →  is a function that assigns, to 
any coalition s N⊆  of players, a set of 
consequences ( )v S X⊆ ; 
¾ ( )i i N∈≥  is the set of all preference 
relations i≥ on X, i N∀ ∈ . 
 Core is probably the most important solution concept 
defined for such games, and here only definitions for NTU-
games are provided next: 
 
Definition 2. The core of the coalitional game without 
transferable payoffs , , , ( )i i NN X v ∈< ≥ >  is the set of all 
( )x v N∈  such that there is no coalition s N⊆  with a 
( )y v s∈  such that iy xf for all  i s∈ . 
3 Group-blind multiuser detection (GMUD) [3] 
under the framework of coalitional game 
theory 
We compare the performance and stability of variety 
coalitional structures under the solution concept of core in 
view of channel condition, SNR etc. 
3.1 Signal/Network model 
Consider a synchronous multi-cell code-division 
multiple-access (CDMA) system with a multiuser receiver, 
that uses binary phase-shift keying (BPSK) modulation, 
assuming B base stations with omni-directional antennas. 
All users are assumed to have symmetric signature 
sequences, i.e., the cross correlation between any two 
signature waveforms from different users are the 
same: ijρ ρ= , 0 1ρ≤ < , for all i j≠ . Note the transmission 
power of each user as P. For each BS receiver, there are two 
kinds of users. 
¾ Known users: For these, the receiver 
knows their signature sequences, and uses them in 
the detector structure. The system can control 
their transmission power. 
¾ Unknown users: For these, the receiver 
does not know their signature sequences, and 
cannot control their transmission power. The 
system does not detect their signals. 
 
Assume there are totally K users in the network, of which M 
are known and N=K－M are unknown for each BS. 
For now we consider only the cooperative form of GMUD in 
BS. Each BS perform joint detection for the known users 
using their signature sequences and estimated channel gains, 
since eliminate interferences from other MSs in the MUD 
group and improve signal-to-noise-interference ratio (SINR) 
of the received signals. In this paper only linear 
decorrelation multiuser detection [3] is considered. 
3.2 Decorrelator GMUD coalitional game 
For MAC channel, Multiuser receivers suppress the 
interference between users in spread-spectrum CDMA 
systems by making use of the structure of the multiple-
access interference and of the knowledge of the code 
sequences, thus achieve a gain in SINR. As the gain of each 
user in SINR by multiuser detection can't possibly share 
among MSs, owning to the technical characteristic of MUD, 
this cooperation can only model as NTU-Game [4]. 
Taking the SINR of received signal as the respective MS's 
payoff , then for the network model in section 3.1, the M 
MSs under each BS can be considered as an coalitional 
game , , , ( )
M
i i MM SINR R ∈< ≥ > , in which M is the set of 
players/MSs, SINR is the allocation function, 
MR is the 
result set, a real vector of M dimension and defining 
preference ( )i i M∈≥  as ordinal relation on real domain. 
 
The SINR (payoff  allocation) of a MS when cooperates in 
the GMUD game can represent as [3]:  
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in which Ω is the formed coalition (the set of MSs which 
cooperate), and cΩ  is the set of MSs outside of the coalition. 
2
iiP h P= is the received power of the signal of MS i at BS, 
ih  is the channel gain of MS i,  and 2σ is the variance of the 
zero mean white Gaussian noise. 
The SINR of a MS when doesn't cooperate (that is, when BS 
uses matched filter receiver) is: 
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Among the basic assumptions of cooperation game are 
coalitional rationality and group rationality, in addition to 
individual rationality. As a player, a MS's individual 
rationality is to maximize its SINR. Here we take the sum 
SINR of all MSs in the coalition as the overall payoff  as the 
group, then the coalitional rationality and group rationality 
of a MS is to seek the maximization of the sum SINR of a 
group or the grand coalition. Stable coalitions are those 
coalitional structures that meet all the above three rationality 
at the same time.   
 
Fading model 
The considered path loss model includes both distance based 
path loss and shadowing. 
2
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in which ih  denotes the dB path loss of the upward channel 
of MS i, K ,μ  is the path loss constant and exponent 
respectively, and sψ  is the shadowing, a zero mean, 
sσ variance Gaussian random variable. 
 
For coalitional game, the number of all possible coalition 
structures is a function of m = |M|, the members of the game, 
and can be obtained from the Bell numbers. The Bell 
number Bn is equal to the number of ways a set of n 
elements can be partitioned into non-empty subsets. As the 
number of possible partitions increases extremely quickly 
with an increase of m, we only consider the cases of a few 
MSs, more complicated cases can be analyzed analogously. 
3.3 Case of single BS 
Considering the case that there are m=3 MSs under the BS,  
B3=5 and possible coalitional structures in this case are: 
{123，12|3，1|23，13|2，1|2|3}. 
 
Fig.1 to fig.4 are simulation results of coalition payoff  of 
each coalition structure under the influence of parameters 
such as SINR, shadowing and path loss exponent 
(MATLAB). 
 
Fig.1 is the positions of MSs relative to BS. For the fading 
model given in (3), the distance of each MS to BS can 
approximately represent their signals strength received at BS. 
Bars in fig.1(b) give the mean value of 10 simulations, to 
mitigate the influence of channel randomness on the payoff s. 
It shows stochastically that:  
¾ Comparing with other coalition structures, 
the grand coalition 123 is payoff maximizing both 
from the point of individual rationality and group 
rationality. So the only stable structure is the grand 
coalition and thus the core of this game is {v([123])}.  
¾ All the coalitional structures are not 
dominated in the sense of individual and group 
payoffs by the non-cooperative case 1|2|3. 
 
   
Fig.1  Single BS case   (a) Layout of BS and MSs    
(b)Payoff of each MS under each coalition structure 
when SNR=27dB(the  1、2、3、4 and 5 in x-coordinate 
denote coalition structure 123、12|3、1|23、13|2 and 
1|2|3 respectively.) 
Fig.2 compares the group payoffs of GMUD game of each 
coalitional structure when SNR (the ratio of MS's 
transmitting power with noise power) increases from -40dB 
to 40dB. 3(b) shows gains of each structure over non-
cooperative case. It's evident that:  
¾ No cooperation structures are dominated 
by non-cooperation case under all SNR. When 
SNR>-20dB, collaborating has notable dominance 
over non-cooperating from the point of group 
rationality. 
¾ Payoff of coalition structure 12|3 is very 
close to that of the grand coalition and has distinct 
dominance over other structures, while the payoff of 
structure 1|23 nearly overlaps with that of non-
cooperating.  
 
   
Fig.2 Single BS case  (a) Total payoffs of each coalition 
structure with respect to SNR  (b) Total payoff gains of 
each coalition structure over non-cooperative case (1|2|3) 
with respect to SNR  
Fig.3 shows the group payoffs of GMUD game of each 
coalitional structure with respect to shadowing. It can be 
seen that the more severe the shadowing, the more 
fluctuating the payoffs, yet their relative positions are still 
same as those in fig.1 and fig.2. Fig 4 shows the effects of 
path loss exponent μon the total payoff of each coalitional 
structure. The distribution of μdepends on distinct radio 
environments[1]. It is about 2 in free space, about 3 in urban 
cells or indoor. It can be seen that whenμ>6, there is hardly 
any advantage to cooperate, when μis very small (near 0), 
the grand coalition has prominent advantage over otherwise 
and in typical urban environment, both structure 12|3 and the 
grand coalition are dominating. 
 
Fig.3 Total payoffs of each coalition structure with 
respect to shadowing 
 
Fig.4 Total payoffs of each coalition structure with 
respect to path loss exponent 
3.4 Case of multiple BSs 
We consider in this section whether the research results can 
be generalized to system with multiple BSs. We don't take 
into consider the inter-BSs cooperation for now. For a 
specific BS, the MSs under other BS are unknown users; the 
signals from these MSs are regarded as interference.  
 
Considering the case of 2 BSs and there are 4 active MSs 
under each of them. Then for each BS, the possible number 
of coalitions is B4=15, namely, {1234，123|4，124|3，
134|2，1|234，12|3|4，13|2|4，14|2|3，23|1|4，24|1|3，
1|2|34，12|34，13|24，14|23，1|2|3|4}. For simplicity, 
based on the conclusion of last section and the layout of BSs 
and MSs in our simulation, we merely select and analyse 
some representative coalition structures. 
 
We give the simulation results of 2 BSs case in fig.5. Fig.5 
(a) shows the network topology, in which each BS has 2 
near MSs and two far nodes respectively. For this network 
layout, in view of our results in last section, we focus our 
attention on the following coalition structures: the grand 
coalition 1234, coalition structure 12|3|4 (indicating the case 
that the two near nodes cooperate and the two far nodes 
don't), structure 2|34 (the two near MSs and the two far MSs 
form two non-overlapping coalition respectively) and the 
non-cooperating case 1|2|3|4. Fig.5(b),(c) show total payoffs 
of coalition model BS1 and BS2 under the above four 
coalition structures when SNR (same as section 3.3) 
increases from -60dB to 20dB. It's obvious that: 
¾ No cooperation structures are dominated 
by non-cooperation case under all SNR---same as 
the single BS case in section 3.3.  
¾ And the grand coalition case has the best 
payoff comparing with other coalition structure.  
¾ The total payoff of 12|3|4 is nearly 
overlapping entirely with that of 12|34, indicating 
that it is of little influence to the total payoff whether 
the far nodes cooperate or not.  
 
Fig.5 Two BSs, each with 4 MSs case 
(a) Layout of BSs and MSs   (b) BS1: Total payoffs of 
each coalition structure with respect to SNR  (c) BS2: 
Total payoffs of each coalition structure with respect to 
SNR   (d) Payoff of each MS under each coalition 
structure when SNR=20dB for both BS1 and BS2 (the  
1、2、3 and 4 in x-coordinate denote coalition structure  
1234、12|3|4、12|34 and 1|2|3|4 respectively.)  
Fig.5(d) shows the total payoffs of both BSs as well as the 
payoff of each MS under four coalition structures when 
SNR=20dB. As the dB value of SINR can be negative, to 
facilitate comparing in histogram, we add |SINRmin| (the 
absolute value of the minimum SINR of all MSs) to all 
SINRs. Thus if SINR of some MS is absent from the figure, 
it means that the value of it is SINRmin. It can be seen that:  
¾ Comparing with other coalition structures, 
the grand coalition 1234 is payoff maximizing both 
from the point of individual rationality and group 
rationality.  
¾ All the coalitional structures are not 
dominated in the sense of individual and group 
payoffs by the non-cooperative case 1|2|3, while the 
gains of near nodes are more distinct. 
¾ There are little differences between the 
payoffs of 12|3|4 (both total payoff and individual 
payoff) and those of 12|34, indicating that it is of 
little influence to total and individual payoff whether 
the far nodes cooperate or not. 
4 Conclusions 
We investigate MAC channel group multiuser detection 
payoffs under the coalitional game theory framework, 
considering both single BS and two BSs cases. Specifically 
we compare the total and individual payoffs of various 
coalition structures in view of different SNR and channel 
conditions. We acquire important results as to the payoffs 
and stability of each coalition structure: 1. Cooperation in 
GMUD form can be profitable in view of both group and 
individual rationality; 2. It is more effective for MSs with 
similar channel condition to cooperate when taking both 
cooperative payoff and cost into account. Further research 
may include cooperation among BSs, whether GMUD 
cooperation can be modelled as TU-Game and if so, when. 
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